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A Different View of the Law:  Habeas Corpus 
During the Lincoln and Bush Presidencies 
Jonathan Hafetz* 
Historical comparisons between presidents are notoriously 
difficult.  They involve assessing choices made at different times, 
under different circumstances, and, often, in the face of varying 
norms, values, and public expectations.  The subject of this 
symposium is no exception.  Comparing President George W. 
Bush’s approach to habeas corpus with President Abraham 
Lincoln’s is no easy task, and certainly not one that can be 
accomplished with sufficient depth in the brief time we have here 
today.  But even a brief comparison is useful, for it helps 
illuminate the choices made by each president.  And important 
distinctions can be drawn—distinctions that shed light on our 
continuing evaluation of the Bush administration’s approach to 
national security issues and that provide another perspective on 
Lincoln’s wartime policies.  In essence, while Lincoln’s 
suspension of habeas corpus has rightly been criticized for 
unnecessarily infringing civil liberties, it differs in quality and in 
kind from the Bush administration’s approach to habeas corpus, 
which was part of a deliberate assault on the Constitution itself. 
I will begin with some brief background on habeas corpus.  I 
will then address the Bush administration’s approach to habeas 
corpus and how it fits into the administration’s detention policy 
in the “war on terror” more generally.  I will conclude with a 
discussion of Lincoln’s Civil War suspension of habeas corpus, 
and how it offers a valuable window into actions taken during the 
past eight years. 
* * * 
Derived from the Latin meaning “you have the body,” habeas 
corpus was the most important and celebrated of the English 
writs to become part of America’s legal system.1  For centuries, 
the writ of habeas corpus has safeguarded individual liberty by 
 
* The author is an attorney in the National Security Project of the American Civil 
Liberties Union.  This article is an edited version of his remarks at the Symposium.  The 
views expressed here are his own. 
 1  CARY FEDERMAN, THE BODY AND THE STATE: HABEAS CORPUS AND AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 1 (2006). 
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affording people seized by the government the right to question 
the grounds for their detention before a judge.2  William 
Blackstone described habeas corpus as a “bulwark of our 
liberties.”3  Alexander Hamilton deemed the writ the most 
important protection against arbitrary state power.4  This 
country’s Founders enshrined the protections of habeas corpus in 
the Constitution, which provides that the writ shall not be 
suspended “unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
public Safety may require it.”5  This provision—known as the 
Suspension Clause—has been called “[t]he most important 
human right in the Constitution.”6  It ensures access to the 
courts for those imprisoned by the government, and makes 
possible “the full realization” of other constitutional guarantees.7 
Habeas corpus, however, does more than protect the freedom 
of the individual from unlawful physical restraint.  It also serves 
an important structural function in our constitutional system.  
By preventing the arbitrary exercise of detention power, it helps 
ensure checks and balances among the branches of government 
and adherence to the rule of law.8 
The suspension of habeas corpus, on the other hand, has 
always been understood as an exceptional power.9  It is a power 
that may be exercised, if at all, only in a true exigency and only 
then as a temporary measure until courts can again perform 
their required function of examining the basis for a prisoner’s 
detention and dispensing justice. 
Over time, habeas corpus has been most commonly employed 
as a post-conviction remedy—a mechanism for those imprisoned 
under the judgment of a state or federal court to seek review of 
their conviction based on constitutional error.10  However, it is 
important to remember that habeas corpus historically provided 
a check against unlawful executive detention, a remedy for those 
detained without charge, without trial, and without judicial 
process.11 
 
 2  Id. 
 3  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 133 (2002). 
 4  THE FEDERALIST 84, (A. Hamilton), at 511 (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961). 
 5  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 6  Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 
B. U. L. REV. 143, 143 (1952). 
 7  David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Detention: Another View, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 59 (2006). 
 8  WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 145 (1980). 
 9  Id. at 141. 
 10  Id. at 155–56. 
 11  Immigr. and Naturalization Services v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001); Note, 
Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L, REV. 1038, 1238 (1970). 
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The Bush administration’s detention of prisoners at 
Guantánamo and elsewhere implicated the core function of 
habeas, for it consisted of an effort to deprive prisoners of all 
meaningful review of their executive confinement.  Further, this 
confinement was potentially permanent, lasting for the duration 
of a “war on terror” without any clear end.  Centuries ago, the 
King of England might lock a prisoner in the Tower of London to 
avoid habeas corpus.  After September 11, the President of the 
United States brought them to Guantánamo. 
* * * 
After September 11, the Bush administration had to decide 
where to bring prisoners captured by U.S. forces and how it 
would treat them.  Some of the prisoners had been captured in 
Afghanistan following the U.S.-led invasion of that country; 
others, however, had been seized at various places across the 
globe, from Bosnia to the Gambia.12 
Guantánamo was not chosen by accident.  The Bush 
administration deliberately brought hundreds of prisoners to the 
U.S. naval base there because it was located in territory that was 
controlled entirely by the United States but was not formally 
part of the United States.13  As a previously secret Justice 
Department legal opinion makes clear, the Bush administration 
believed that this absence of formal sovereignty over 
Guantánamo meant that habeas corpus would not extend to the 
territory, therefore avoiding judicial review of the detention and 
treatment of the prisoners there.14  At the same time, the Bush 
administration made a series of determinations that the 
prisoners at Guantánamo, as well as others held as “enemy 
combatants,” in the global “war on terror,” were not entitled to 
any protections under U.S. or international law, including under 
the Geneva Conventions.15  In short, Guantánamo was designed 
as a legal black hole. 
 
 12  Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2241 (2008). 
 13  HOWARD BALL, BUSH, THE DETAINEES, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE BATTLE OVER 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN THE WAR ON TERROR 97 (2007). 
 14  Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin and John C. Yoo to William J. Haynes II 
(Dec. 28, 2001), Re: Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in Guantánamo Bay, 
Cuba, in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 29–37 (Karen J. Greenberg & 
Joshua L. Dratel eds., Cambridge University Press 2005). 
 15  Memorandum from President George W. Bush to The Vice President, The 
Secretary of State, The Secretary of Defense, The Attorney General, the Chief of Staff to 
the President, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Feb. 7, 2002), 
Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra 
note 14, at 134–35. 
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In seeking to deny Guantánamo detainees’ habeas corpus 
rights, the Bush administration relied on formal legal constructs, 
not exigency.  It argued that because the detainees were foreign 
nationals held outside the United States, they were necessarily 
outside the reach of the federal habeas corpus statute, the 
Suspension Clause, and the Constitution generally.  In other 
words, the Bush administration did not claim habeas corpus 
needed to be suspended to deprive Guantánamo detainees of 
habeas review because they had no right to that review in the 
first place.16  The Bush administration further maintained that 
by designating detainees at Guantánamo as “enemy combatants” 
it could hold them indefinitely, potentially for life, without 
charge.  The Bush administration also applied the same 
argument to the thousands of others being detained by the 
United States outside the nation’s borders, including at the 
Bagram Theater Internment Facility at Bagram Airfield in 
Afghanistan, secret CIA-run prisons (or “black sites”), as well as 
two individuals (Jose Padilla and Ali al-Marri) seized and held in 
military detention within the United States.17  The result: a 
global-wide detention network that sought to place an entire 
category of persons permanently beyond the law. 
Meanwhile, without court scrutiny, the Bush administration 
implemented a system of indefinite detention without charge, 
sham military tribunals, and state-sanctioned torture and abuse 
authorized at the highest levels of the U.S. government.  Further, 
under the Bush administration’s view, any action taken by the 
executive was legal if done in the name of national security, even 
if Congress explicitly prohibited that action.  Secrecy pervaded 
every aspect of Guantánamo.  Indeed, the Bush administration 
refused even to disclose the names of the prisoners, many of 
whom disappeared for years into U.S. custody in violation of 
basic principles of the U.S. Constitution and international law.  
The fact that over time Guantánamo would be brought—at least 
partially—within a legal framework had nothing to do with the 
Bush administration, which resisted affording detainees any 
protections and sought to undermine court rulings every step of 
the way.  Rather, it had to do with the resilience of habeas 
corpus, which ultimately led to three landmark Supreme Court 
decisions invalidating important components of the Bush 
administration’s post-9/11 detention policy. 
 
 16  See Jonathan Hafetz, The Guantanamo Effect and Some Troubling Implications 
of Limiting Habeas Rights Domestically, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 351, 351 (2007). 
 17  BALL, supra note 13, at 27–28, 70-71; Hafetz, supra note 16, at 354. 
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The first in that trio, Rasul v. Bush, held that Guantánamo 
detainees had a right to habeas corpus review under federal 
statute.18  The Supreme Court, moreover, rebuked the Bush 
administration for departing from the United States’ most 
fundamental and deeply held legal principles, noting that 
“[e]xecutive imprisonment has been considered oppressive and 
lawless” since the Magna Carta.19  The administration, however, 
then defied the Supreme Court, trying to block habeas review by 
creating military boards—known as Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals—that lacked the most basic elements of due process, 
denying detainees an opportunity to see and respond to the 
evidence against them before a neutral decision maker and 
relying on information gained through torture and other 
coercion.20  The administration also pushed Congress twice to 
amend the federal habeas statute, which had been in place since 
the Nation’s founding, to repeal access to habeas corpus for 
individuals detained as “enemy combatants.”21 
The second decision, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, reaffirmed 
detainees’ right to habeas corpus and invalidated the military 
commissions established unilaterally by President Bush to try 
detainees for war crimes.22  The Court ruled that the 
commissions failed to comply with the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice and the Geneva Conventions.23  Further, the Court 
rejected the notion that any prisoner was outside the law, ruling 
that, at a minimum, the baseline protections of Common Article 
3 of the Geneva Conventions applied to all persons in U.S. 
custody.24 
The third and final decision, Boumediene v. Bush,25 was the 
most important and far-reaching.  Once again, the Supreme 
Court ruled that Guantánamo detainees were entitled to habeas 
corpus.26  But this time, the Court made clear that the right to 
habeas was grounded in the Constitution’s Suspension Clause, 
not merely in federal statute, striking down Congress’s most 
 
 18  Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (finding a right to habeas corpus under 28 
U.S.C. § 2241). 
 19  Id. at 474 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 20  See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 542 U.S. 507, 509–13. 
 21  See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) 
[hereinafter “DTA”]; Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 
(2006) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §948a (2006)) [hereinafter “MCA”]. 
 22  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 558–59 (2006).  The Court ruled that the first 
court-stripping statute, the DTA, did not apply to pending cases.  Id. at 575–76. 
 23  Id. at 613, 631–32. 
 24  Id. 
 25  128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 26  Id. at 2234. 
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recent court-stripping legislation.27  Even more importantly, the 
Court did not limit its ruling to Guantánamo, but instead held 
that habeas could potentially reach anywhere the United States 
deprived a person of liberty.  The political branches, the Court 
explained, did not have the power to “switch the Constitution on 
or off at will” merely by altering the place of detention.28  
Treating detention as a shell game, where a prisoner’s location 
could be shifted to evade habeas review, the Court explained, 
would make the scope of the Suspension Clause “subject to 
manipulation by those [Executive branch officials] whose power 
it is designed to restrain.”29  The Court thus dealt a powerful 
blow not only to Guantánamo but also to the broader concept of a 
lawless enclave on which Guantánamo and other post-9/11 
detention sites were based. 
Supporters of the Bush administration have invoked Lincoln 
as a historical precedent.  Lincoln, they argue, suspended habeas 
corpus in the exercise of his commander-in-chief power to defend 
the nation in a time of crisis.  Bush merely followed his example 
by making necessary abridgments of civil liberties in wartime, 
one of which was to limit access to the federal courts by those 
detained for security purposes. 
Before comparing the two presidents, let us review briefly 
the actions taken to suspend habeas corpus during Lincoln’s 
administration.  Following the firing of the first shots on Fort 
Sumter by the Confederacy in April 1861, President Lincoln took 
a number of steps to protect the Union, including calling for the 
blockage of Southern ports and for the states to supply 75,000 
new militia members.30  Lincoln also authorized army generals to 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus where necessary “for the 
public safety,” initially along the military line between 
Philadelphia and Washington (following rioting in Maryland) and 
later to other places, as far north as Maine.31  At the time, 
Lincoln confronted the real prospect that Washington, D.C., 
might be taken by Confederate forces.32 
Congress was not in session when Lincoln suspended habeas 
corpus.33  When Congress met several months later in a special 
session (convened by Lincoln), Lincoln defended his suspension of 
 
 27  Id. at 2243. 
 28  Id. at 2259. 
 29  Id  
 30  See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the 
Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 997 (2008). 
 31  Id. at 998. 
 32  See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 16–17 (2003). 
 33  Id. at 158–59. 
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the writ in a July 4 message to legislators.34  He famously asked 
Congress, “[A]re all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the 
government itself to go to pieces lest that one be violated?”35  In 
effect, Lincoln asserted that in a time of emergency, a president 
needed the ability to take action to preserve the republic and its 
constitutional fabric, even if that meant suspending a right as 
fundamental as habeas corpus.36 
Although Congress quickly ratified a number of Lincoln’s 
emergency measures, it did not act on his suspension of habeas 
corpus for almost two years.  Then, in March 1863, Congress 
enacted the Habeas Corpus Act, which authorized the President 
to suspend habeas corpus in any case within the United States 
where the public safety might require it.37  The act, however, also 
limited the length of time individuals other than prisoners of war 
could be held without criminal charge.38 
Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War 
led to abuses and deprivations of basic freedoms that, in many 
instances, could not be justified on grounds of necessity.  In 
addition, many individuals were charged and tried before 
military commissions, rather than civilian courts, even though 
some of those military proceedings took place in areas where the 
civilian courts were open and functioning—a practice the 
Supreme Court eventually struck down as unconstitutional.39 
Some of Lincoln’s actions also raised significant separation of 
powers concerns.  Perhaps most notably, Lincoln allowed his 
officers to ignore judicial orders granting habeas relief to 
prisoners, including one from Roger Taney, Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, sitting as a circuit judge in Ex parte Merryman.40 
Yet, Lincoln’s approach to habeas corpus differed from 
Bush’s in important ways—ways that illuminate some of the 
most deeply problematic aspects of the Bush administration’s 
“war on terror.”  Lincoln acted out of a genuine sense of exigency, 
initially suspending habeas corpus when the nation’s capital was 
under siege and, indeed, the nation’s survival itself hung in the 
balance.  Admittedly, the suspension power was later exercised 
more broadly, and extended to areas not under any direct threat.  
But it was also intended to be temporary, as suspension of 
 
 34  Id. 
 35  Abraham Lincoln, Special Session Message (July 4, 1861), 7 COMP. MESSAGES & 
PAPERS PRES. 3226 (James D. Richardson ed., 1917). 
 36  FARBER, supra note 32, at 159. 
 37  Act of Mar. 3, 1863, § 1, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755. 
 38  Id.  §§ 2–3. 
 39  See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
 40  17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. 1861) (No. 9,487). 
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ordinary judicial process for a limited period of time when 
observance of that process was not believed possible or feasible. 
Lincoln’s suspension also reflected a more limited vision of 
executive power.  Lincoln initially suspended habeas corpus 
when Congress was not in session—and hence when legislative 
approval was not an option.  To be sure, the suspension 
continued without congressional imprimatur until March 1863, 
and led to the imprisonment of more than thirteen thousand 
individuals in military jails without charges or trial, including 
newspaper editors considered sympathetic to the Confederate 
cause.41  But Lincoln did seek to promptly justify his actions 
before Congress and, more importantly, never asserted the power 
to act against the specific instruction of Congress even as he 
maintained presidential authority to suspend the writ in a time 
of emergency.42 
President Bush, by contrast, did not seek temporary limits 
on habeas corpus, but sought to deny access to the writ to an 
entire category of people in a conflict he himself insisted was of 
potentially limitless duration and scope and would last at least 
several generations.  The Bush administration also explicitly 
discriminated based on alienage, as part of an effort to create a 
permanent second-class justice system for foreign nationals 
detained under the elastic and malleable label of “enemy 
combatant”—an effort that later gained congressional sanction 
through court-stripping legislation.43 
The purpose underlying the actions of these two presidents 
differed in another important respect.  At bottom, Lincoln’s 
suspension rested on the notion that in a time of crisis and public 
danger, habeas corpus might have to be sacrificed temporarily to 
preserve the public safety and the larger framework of 
government—a situation expressly contemplated by the 
Suspension Clause and consistent with the writ’s history.44  
President Bush too sought to defend the nation, albeit from a 
different threat than that which confronted Lincoln—the threat 
posed by al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations rather than 
an internal armed rebellion.  But, as time has made clear, the 
Bush administration’s efforts to eliminate habeas corpus had 
little, if anything, to do with security, and everything to do with 
covering up embarrassment, if not illegality. 
 
 41  Steven R. Shapiro, The Role of the Courts in the War against Terrorism: A 
Preliminary Assessment, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 103, 104 (2005). 
 42  FARBER, supra note 32, at 158–59. 
 43  MCA, supra note 21; DTA, supra note 21. 
 44  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
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The Bush administration’s detention policies were driven by 
an effort to shield dubious and in some instances patently 
unlawful practices from public and judicial scrutiny.  The 
administration continued to oppose habeas corpus for detainees 
at Guantánamo (and elsewhere) in order to evade review of its 
underlying effort to deny those detainees basic protections under 
the Constitution and international law, including the Geneva 
Conventions, to which every prior administration had adhered. 
Those protections included the right to due process, the right to a 
fair trial, and the right to be free from torture and other abuse.45  
The Bush administration also opposed habeas corpus because it 
feared that, in many cases, meaningful review would cause its 
assertion that the detainees were dangerous terrorists (or “the 
worst of the worst”) to crumble and thereby expose the 
underlying falsehood on which Guantánamo rested.  And, finally, 
it opposed habeas corpus because it feared that courts would 
impose checks on its quest for unprecedented and untrammeled 
executive authority—a power grab encapsulated by David 
Addington’s statement that “We’re going to push and push and 
push until some larger force makes us stop.”46 
Lincoln, by contrast, acknowledged that a president’s war 
powers were constrained by the laws of war and, moreover, 
sought to codify the laws and usages of war in military 
regulations so that Union forces could better understand and 
follow them—an effort that resulted in the “Lieber Code,” a 
foundation for the development of the modern law of war.47  
Lincoln also did not assert the authority as commander-in-chief 
to override or ignore acts of Congress, as Bush did on numerous 
important issues, including by claiming the power to disregard 
the long-established and categorical prohibition against torture.48  
Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, in short, did not reflect an 
effort to expand executive power in a way that was designed to 
avoid legal constraints and permanently insulate that power 
from judicial review and accountability. 
This is not to deny that there were violations of the laws of 
war or abuses of individual liberties during Lincoln’s presidency.  
 
 45  1 FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949 26, 35–36 
(William S. Hein & Co., 2004). 
 46  See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 126 (2007). 
 47  See FRANCIS LIEBER, THE LIEBER CODE OF 1863: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE 
GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD 31 (1863) (General Order 
No. 100); Barron & Lederman, supra note 30, at 994–95; see also Grant R. Doty, The 
United States and the Development of the Laws of Land Warfare, 156 MIL. L. REV. 224, 
230–32 (1998) (describing influence of the Lieber Code). 
 48  See generally FARBER, supra note 48. 
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Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, moreover, raised 
significant constitutional concerns, including over the president’s 
emergency power to suspend the writ, for how long, and under 
what circumstances.49  But the history surrounding the 
suspension of habeas corpus during Lincoln’s presidency may be 
understood as a product of the unfortunate, if familiar, tendency 
toward over-reaction in a time of war. 
President Bush’s actions toward habeas corpus and the 
treatment of detainees generally reflect something very different.  
While Bush administration officials also invoked national 
security, they sought to eliminate habeas corpus to cover-up 
illegality, to cloak unlawful detention and mistreatment in 
secrecy, and to institutionalize an unprecedented expansion of 
executive power.  Their various maneuvers through years of 
battles over habeas corpus in the courts and in Congress were 
taken not to defend the rule of law but to undermine it—in 
defiance of the Constitution and of the truth itself. 
 
 49  See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, The Field Theory: Martial Law, the Suspension 
Power, and the Insurrection Act, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 391, 397–415 (2007) (discussing the 
historical and continuing controversy over Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus). 
